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Why did evolution not give us a utility function that is offspring alone? Why do we
care intrinsically about other outcomes, food, for example, and what determines the
intensity of such preferences? A common view is that such other outcomes enhance
fitness and the intensity of our preference for a given outcome is proportional to its
contribution to fitness. We argue that this view is inaccurate. Specifically, we show
that in the presence of informational imperfections, the evolved preference for a given
outcome is determined by the individual’s degree of ignorance regarding its signifi-
cance. Our model sheds light on imitation and prepared learning, whereby some peer
attitudes are more influential than others. Testable implications of the model include
systematically biased choices in modern times. Most notably, we apply the model to
help explain the demographic transition.
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Despite a steady trickle of research on the issue over the last 20 years, it remains unconven-
tional to consider the biological basis of utility or preferences.1 This approach holds out the
promise of generating a utility function with the key economic properties of being exogenous
and invariant. At first blush, such a biologically derived utility would value commodities
in accordance with their impact on fitness– we should value food, for example, in terms of
its marginal contribution to biological success. However, on reflection, a serious conceptual
problem arises– why have we been made to care about anything other than offspring? Why,
that is, if we are rational and intelligent, are we not programmed to like only offspring and
then to treat food, for example, as purely instrumental, as a means to an end? In modern
times, indeed, we readily sacrifice expected offspring to increase consumption of other com-
modities. The recent “demographic transition,”during which incomes rose but fertility fell
is dramatic prima facie evidence on this score.
We consider a solution to this conundrum in terms of information. Our theory has two
key components:
First, the individual has two signals available concerning the state of the world. On the
one hand, there are relevant aspects of the environment that are “recurrent signals”in the
sense of having a long evolutionary history. For example, sunlight has long had an effect in
aiding Vitamin D production and thereby enhancing health and fitness.2 Nature then has
had the opportunity to incorporate a liking for the sun in the utility function. On the other
hand, there are relevant aspects of the environment that are “transient signals”in the sense of
being local in time and space, and having arisen only rarely before, or perhaps never. These
signals might concern likely locations in which to sunbathe, for example. Natural selection
could not have incorporated these aspects of the environment in the utility function.
Secondly, the individual has arbitrary beliefs concerning the implications of the two
signals, but is otherwise rational. In particular, the individual maximizes the expectation
of his utility, conditioning on both the recurrent and transient signals, using these arbitrary
beliefs.
1Becker (1976) was an early exponent of the need to link economics to biology. More particularly, Robson
(2001b) argues that a utility function serves as a method for Nature to partially decentralize control, thus
achieving a flexible response to novelty. There is a distinct literature that considers how preferences that
are not fitness might evolve to yield a fitness advantage in particular games. See, for example, Güth &Yaari
(1992) and Dekel, Ely & Yilankaya (2007).
2The full importance of Vitamin D was only recently recognized.
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We derive two general results. First, despite Nature’s inability to condition the individ-
ual’s utility on the transient signal, and despite the individual’s holding arbitrary beliefs,
Nature can shape the individual’s utility such that the equilibrium action chosen by the
individual is the best possible in the sense of maximizing expected fitness conditional on
both signals. Secondly, the resulting marginal utility of an action is determined not by the
marginal contribution of that action to fitness, but by the individual’s degree of ignorance
regarding such contribution.
Our model sheds new light on the demographic transition. Specifically, we argue that
humans have evolved direct concerns for offspring quality and for imitation of peer fertil-
ity that are evolutionarily suboptimal in modern circumstances. We at once buttress the
approach of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and that of Becker and Lewis (1973).
Our theoretical approach is an instance of the principal-agent problem. In this interpreta-
tion, the principal (Nature), maximizes the productivity of the agent (individual) by choosing
the agent’s utility function. Papers that also employ the principal-agent metaphor, explic-
itly or implicitly, include Binmore (1994), Frederick & Lowenstein (1999), Robson (2001a),
Samuelson (2004), Rayo & Becker (2007), Netzer (2009), and Herold & Netzer (2010). While
the principal-agent perspective is illuminating, there are no formal techniques or results that
can be directly imported from the existing literature.3 In fact, the specific principal-agent
problem we consider is not meaningful in conventional economic applications. Most signifi-
cantly, we assume that (i) the principal has the power to fully shape the agent’s preferences,
(ii) all actions of the agent are contractible in the sense that utility depends directly on the
action, and (iii) the principal has information that cannot be directly communicated to the
agent, despite the parties having parallel interests in the information.
A paper that can be described in analogous terms is Samuelson and Swinkels (2006),
who also consider an environment in which both Nature and the individual possess relevant
information. In an ideal case, the individual would maximize expected fitness. In their
work, unlike ours, there is an emphasis on second-best solutions that provide a rationale for
behavioral biases. We discuss the key issue of why the Samuelson and Swinkels approach
leads to a second-best situation but ours does not in Section 2.1.
Our focus throughout is on “primary”rather than “secondary”arguments of utility. That
is, we consider arguments that are desired as ends in themselves rather than as means to
3In spirit, ours is a model of delegation. See, for example, Holmstrom (1984), Aghion & Tirole (1997),
Melumad, Mookherjee & Reichelstein (1997), Dessein (2002), Alonso & Matouschek (2008), and Armstrong
& Vickers (2010).
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an end. There are many primary arguments, of course. For example, Linden’s list includes
food, prestige, temperature, a view, and sex (see Linden, 2011). Bentham lists 26 categories
of “simple”pleasures and pains (Bentham, 1789). Perhaps the most salient example of a
secondary argument is money, which is fundamentally only a means to an end from the
perspective of the individual.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the basic model. We dismiss as unrealistic the possibility that the
individual’s beliefs match the true distribution. This leaves us with a mechanism in which
Nature shapes utility in the light of her recurrent information and the individual maximizes
expected utility conditional on arbitrary beliefs. Section 2.1 considers the problem of ex-
istence of a utility function that guarantees first-best actions. Although existence may be
a delicate issue in a general continuous formulation, it is a straightforward question in a
discrete approximation.
Section 3 reverts to a continuous formulation, while also imposing a monotone structure
on the problem, for concreteness. The main result of the paper is Theorem 1 which proves
that optimal choice can be supported by a utility function that has a simple additive form.
Section 3 intertwines the theoretical argument with two simple but economically relevant
examples. The first of these involves choice of labor-leisure; the second involves the quantity-
quality tradeoff for offspring.
Section 4 considers how the evolutionary re-shaping of utility would result in system-
atically ineffi cient choices in a modern environment, assuming that this environment now
entails accurate beliefs. We propose this observation as the key testable empirical implica-
tion of the present model. We use the quantity-quality example to illustrate how ineffi cient
choices would arise, with an application to the demographic transition that occurred during
the industrial revolution.
Section 5 shows how the present framework can be readily adapted to consider the evo-
lution of interdependent preferences. We show how imitation, a desire for conformity, would
arise. We then focus on a model that is generalized in that it allows an infinite sequence
of individuals, each observing the action of a predecessor, but simplified in that it assumes
quadratic fitness and normal signals. This model yields insights into the intriguing psycho-
4Not all of Bentham’s categories seem clearly primary. For example, he nominates wealth as a simple
pleasure, but then defends this choice in terms of what the money can buy.
Since money is a very familiar means, it induces a rather automatic response. It was once thought that
the fMRI signature of money could not be distinguished from that of sex. However, Sescousse et al. (2010)
show that money and sex have subtly distinct fMRI signatures, reflecting the instrumental role of money.
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logical phenomemon of “prepared learning.”In modern circumstances, with accurate beliefs,
there is overimitation, providing support for the analysis by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman
(1981) of the demographic transition. Section 5.1 provides an account of the demographic
transition that integrates overimitation with an exaggerated concern with offspring quality.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
There are two players: a principal (Nature) and an agent (the individual). The agent faces
a one-shot opportunity to produce fitness y ∈ R (representing quality-adjusted offspring).
Fitness is a function of the individual’s choice of a vector of actions x ∈ RN and an underlying
state σ ∈ R:
y = ϕ(x, σ).
The players have only partial knowledge of the state. That knowledge has two compo-
nents: s ∈ R and t ∈ R. These components represent, respectively, recurrent and transient
aspects of the environment. The essential distinction is that the utility function given to the
individual can depend on the recurrent component, s, but not on the transient component,
t. From Nature’s point of view, the (“true”) distribution of σ conditional on (s, t) is given by
the pdf f(σ | s, t); from the individual’s point of view, the (“subjective”) distribution of σ
conditional on t is given by the pdf g(σ | s, t). We allow Nature to shape utility in the light
of these pdfs f and g.
A more detailed interpretation of s and t is as follows. On the one hand, s represents
observed aspects of the environment whose implications have remained constant over evolu-
tionary time. For example, s might represent exposure to sunlight. Exposure to UV light,
in particular, aids in the production of Vitamin D, which is essential for health. The pdf f
incorporates the true effect of sunlight on fitness. The individual, however, can be largely or
completely ignorant of this causal chain, having arbitrary beliefs as captured by the pdf g.
The recurrent nature of this causal chain means, however, that Nature can shape the utility
function in the light of s.
The reason we explicitly include the signal s is to allow it to change over time. For
example, if you are warm, cold drinks are helpful; if you are cold, hot. Evolution has
made the appropriate drink seem pleasurable in each circumstance. Kandel et al. (2000)
describe the neurological basis of this phenomenon. In terms of our model, this phenomenon
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corresponds to allowing utility to depend upon an s that can have a number of possible
realizations that vary over time. The signal s is recurrent, since each of these circumstances
is evolutionarily familiar. This interpretation of a recurrent signal is especially useful in the
model of imitation in Section 5. There, the action of a predecessor has a number of possible
values, but each of these is taken to be evolutionarily familiar, so evolved utility can be made
a function of this action. Although we need the signal s for the sake of generality and to
facilitate extensions of the model, the basic results can be appreciated by suppressing s.
On the other hand, t represents observed aspects of the environment that may be im-
portant but have a one-off quality. For instance, a hunter observes the exact position and
strength of his prey, as well as the current abundance of alternative sources of food. By
observing these precise local conditions, in the language of Binmore (1994), the individual
serves as Nature’s “eyes.”We assume that the rarity, or even complete novelty, of such an
aspect means that Nature cannot condition utility on t.
We have assumed that, although Nature cannot make utility dependent on t, Nature
does shape utility in the light of f and g. In what sense is this a plausible assumption? If
t represents completely unrestricted novelty, it is clearly not. For it to be plausible, there
must be a suitable restriction on novelty. Specifically, f and g need to be suffi ciently simple
functions. Consider the following example. Fitness is given by σx − (1/2)x2, where x is
effort by the individual and σ is the state of the world. The individual receives a signal
t. (For simplicity, we abstract from the signal s.) The true distribution of the state given
t is given by a pdf f with the property that Ef (σ|t) = t. It follows that the true optimal
choice of x is x∗(t) = t. Suppose the individual’s belief concerning the distribution of the
state given t is given by a pdf g with the property that Eg(σ|t) = Mt where M > 1. That
is, the individual has overly optimistic beliefs about the marginal benefit of effort. If the
individual maximized fitness in the light of the pdf g, he would expend an excessive level of
effort x̂(t) = Mt > t. However, the individual can be induced to choose x∗(t) if the evolved
utility is σx − (M/2)x2. Thus, a simple evolutionarily optimal response to the individual’s
misperception of the state is to have the individual perceive an inflated cost of effort. We
analyze a more general version of this example, as Example 1, in Section 3 below. For the
present purpose, the relevant feature is that, although utility here is independent of the
realization of t, the utility construction works for all such realizations.
The model proceeds in three stages:
1. Nature selects a utility function U(x, y, s) for the individual which can depend on the
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choice, x, realized fitness, y, on the, as yet, undetermined realization of s, but not on
that of t. The goal of the principal is to maximize the agent’s true expected fitness, as
expressed via the pdf f .
2. The signals s, t are realized.
3. The agent learns his utility function U, observes s, t and chooses x. The goal of the
agent is to maximize his expected utility conditional on the information available to
him, as expressed in the pdf g.
4. The state σ is drawn and the payoffs of both players —fitness for the principal and
utility for the agent —are realized.
We interpret this setting as a metaphor for the long-run outcome of an evolutionary
process in which the utility functions of humans are heritable and are the object of natural
selection. Over time, through a trial-and-error process, those individuals endowed with
utility functions that best promote their own fitness dominate the population. Rather than
explicitly modelling such trial-and-error process, we suppose Nature can directly “choose”a
fitness-maximizing utility function for each human being.
From the principal’s perspective, the ideal choice of x solves
max
x
Ef [y | s, t] , (1)
where Ef means that the expectation is taken with respect to the true pdf f. For simplicity,
we assume that, for each pair (s, t), this problem has a unique solution, denoted x∗(s, t). If
a function U implements x∗(s, t) for all (s, t), we say it is optimal.
The individual is fully informed
If the individual is fully informed, so that g = f, his objective is
max
x
Ef [U(x, y, s) | s, t] . (2)
A trivially optimal utility function is then
U(y) ≡ y,
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which perfectly aligns the agent’s objective (2) with the principal’s objective (1).
Such resolution, however, is not a realistic description of humans. Most obviously, per-
haps, we do not value only offspring intrinsically, viewing sex, for example, purely as an
instrumental means to the end of producing more offspring. Less obviously, but perhaps
more convincingly, consider how the experimental results of Wedekind et al. (1995) imply
that our utility functions have arguments other than fitness. These results are that males
with compatible immune systems appear to smell good to women. In the language of Barash
(1979), a pleasant smell produces a “whispering within”that motivates them to select such
mates. This amounts to this smell being an argument of utility. We are not born knowing
that compatibility between parental immune systems is relevant to the fitness of offspring,
or with any knowledge about how to check such compatibility.
The individual is not fully informed
When the individual holds arbitrary beliefs g his problem becomes
max
x
Eg [U(x, y, s) | s, t] = max
x
∫
U(x, y, s)g(σ | s, t)dσ,
where Eg means that the expectation is taken with respect to the subjective pdf g, and where
y = ϕ(x, σ). Note that t affects the individual’s decision exclusively though the conditional
distribution of σ, whereas s serves also as a parameter of the utility function.
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict attention to this scenario. We will show that
this mechanism is constrained optimal, for hunter-gatherers, so there would have been no
selection pressure for modification.
2.1 First-Best Implementation —Finite Case
In general, a basic theoretical question is whether there exists a function Ū that depends
only on x, σ, and s and that satisfies the integral equation∫
ϕ(x, σ)f(σ|s, t)dσ =
∫
Ū(x, σ, s)g(σ|s, t)dσ,
where the functions ϕ(x, σ), f(σ|s, t) and g(σ|s, t) have been specified exogenously. If y =
ϕ(x, σ) were strictly monotonic in σ, for each x, then the existence of a function U(x, y, s)
that implements the fitness-maximizing action x∗(s, t) for all s, t would be a consequence.
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However, the existence of a solution for Ū(x, σ, s) to such a “Fredholm equation of the first
kind”(Hochstadt, 1973) is a delicate issue.5
The choice of a continuous formulation over a discrete one here is mainly a matter of
convenience. Indeed, from a conceptual point of view, a discrete formulation seems unob-
jectionable. In such a formulation, existence can be readily addressed. Suppose, then, that












g(σ|s, t), for all x.
This equation has a unique solution for the row vector
1×S︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ū(x, σ, s) if and only if the matrix
S×S︷ ︸︸ ︷
g(σ|s, t) is non-singular, which is a condition that holds generically.6
More generally, σ and t might be restricted to finite sets of different sizes, {1, ..., S} and
{1, ..., T}. Perhaps the plausible alternative case is where the number of signals is less than
the number of states, and so S > T . That is, there are more unknowns, as in
1×S︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ū(x, σ, s), than
there are equations, where there is one for each signal, t. If the matrix
S×T︷ ︸︸ ︷
g(σ|s, t) has full rank,
T , then there is again no problem of existence; rather there is an issue of multiplicity– there
are many solutions for
1×S︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ū(x, σ, s).
We have then proved a simple but illuminating result–
Proposition 1 Suppose S ≥ T. If the matrix
S×T︷ ︸︸ ︷
g(σ|s, t) has full rank, T , there exists a solution
for the row vector
1×S︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ū(x, σ, s).
That is, under the stated conditions, there is a utility function that fully compensates
for arbitrary erroneous beliefs on the part of the agent. Hence, despite these beliefs, the
first-best evolutionary outcome is attained.
5We are grateful to Phil Reny for suggesting the approach adopted in this section.
6Generically, any S × S matrix (with non-negative entries) has a nonzero determinant. Now normalize
each column by dividing by the sum of the entries in that column to obtain
S×S︷ ︸︸ ︷
g(σ|t). This normalization does
not affect the sign of the determinant.
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The approach we take in the remainder of the paper reverts to a continuous formulation,
but sidesteps the issue of existence by imposing additional structure. This structure is mainly
intended to generate a tractable model, and to make available further results, but, as a side
effect, it ensures existence.
Comparison with Samuelson and Swinkels
Proposition 1 provides a good vantage point from which to discuss the relationship of
the current approach to Samuelson and Swinkels (2006). A crucial difference is the general
presumption in Samuelson and Swinkels that the first-best evolutionary outcome is beyond
reach, which stands in sharp contrast to Proposition 1. Although the two models have
similar motivations, there are many differences in the details. The key difference seems to
be as follows. In Samuelson and Swinkels, there is a rich signal structure, with signals lying
in [0, 1]2. There is not a comparable richness in the utility function. This utility function
can be modified by adding a single parameter to encourage one of the two choices that are
available to be favored. This utility function does not provide enough flexibility to attain
the first-best, given the complexity of the signal structure. However, this ineffi ciency is less
important for them given their emphasis on providing a foundation for behavioral biases.
3 A Monotone Environment
We revert to seeking an optimal utility function of the form U(x, y, s). We first relax the
requirement of matching the functions Ef (ϕ(x, σ)) and Eg (U(x, y, σ)) asking only that ex-
pected utility be maximized by x∗(s, t). That is, we require only that,
x∗(s, t) ≡ arg max
x
∫
ϕ(x, σ)f(σ|s, t)dσ = arg max
x
∫
U(x, y, s)g(σ|s, t)dσ, for all s, t.
This relaxation of the restrictions on utility is helpful. It is reasonable as well, since there
would have been be no biological selection that achieved any more.7
Next, we impose assumptions on ϕ, f, and g. These assumptions guarantee that decisions
are “monotone”in the sense that the optimal action is an increasing function of the recurrent
and transient signals.
7We assume x∗(s, t) is finite.
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Assumption 1 i) Fitness ϕ(x, σ) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave
in x.8
ii) Increasing the state σ increases the marginal product of each action: ϕxiσ(x, σ) > 0,
for i = 1, ..., N.
iii) Actions are complements in that ϕxixj(x, σ) ≥ 0, for all i, j = 1, ..., N, i 6= j.
Assumption 2 The pdfs f(σ|s, t) and g(σ|s, t) are continuously differentiable in (s, t) and
strictly increasing, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, in s and in t.9
These suffi ce to establish that decisions are monotone–
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, x∗i (s, t) is differentiable, with
∂
∂s
x∗i (s, t) > 0, and
∂
∂t
x∗i (s, t) > 0, for all i.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to illuminate the current approach, we interweave two examples of economic
interest with the development of the theory. The first of these concerns the cost of effort.
We consider plausible circumstances under which it would be optimal for evolution to inhibit
effort. At the end of this section, we return to this example, giving there evidence on the
exact biochemical mechanism by which this inhibition is orchestrated.
Example 1 Effort. Suppose x ∈ R measures costly effort devoted by the individual to a
given task, and suppose fitness is given by the net success in this task:
ϕ(x, σ) = σx− C(x),
where σx measures a material output (a function of both effort and the random state σ),
and C(x) measures the cost of time and energy in units of fitness, with C(x) increasing and
convex.
Given signals s and t, the first-best effort level x∗(s, t) equates (expected) marginal benefit
and marginal cost:
Ef [σ | s, t] = C ′(x).
8Specifically, we require that the matrix of second derivatives of ϕ(·, σ) is everywhere negative definite.
9Specifically, we require that
∫
v(σ)∂f(σ|s,t)∂s dσ > 0 for all continuous and strictly increasing functions v;
similarly for t.
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Assumption 1 is satisfied, so, under Assumption 2, x∗(s, t) is increasing in both signals s
and t.
A simple formulation for the cost function C is the familiar quadratic function C(x) =
Ax2, which leads to the quadratic fitness function:
ϕ(x, σ) = σx− Ax2.
The second of these examples concerns the choice of the quality and quantity of offspring.
When we return to this example at the end of this section, we argue that it is plausible that
utility evolved to compensate for the individual’s ignorance of the implications of quality.
In the next section, we develop this application further to illustrate how modern behavior
might be rendered suboptimal by its reliance on such evolved utility. In particular, we apply
the example to help explain the demographic transition as occuring in Europe during the
Industrial Revolution.
Example 2 Quantity versus quality of offspring. Suppose the individual can have any
number of offspring she desires, but the quality of each offspring is determined by a time
investment. Ignoring integer constraints on the number of offspring, let n ∈ R+ denote the
individual’s number of offspring and let x ∈ R+ denote her time investment per offspring,
which we assume to be equal across offspring. Assuming the individual is endowed with one
unit of time, she faces the budget constraint
n · x = 1.
Suppose fitness is given by
n ·H(x, σ),
where H denotes the quality of each offspring, a function of both the time investment x per
offspring and the random state σ.





Given signals s and t, the first-best time investment x∗(s, t) equates (expected) average and
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marginal quality, which is a familiar result in neoclassical production theory:






= Ef [Hx(x∗(s, t), σ) | s, t] .
Note that, under Assumptions 1, as applied to h(x, σ), and 2, the first-best time investment
x∗(s, t) is increasing (and the optimal number of offspring is decreasing) in both signals s
and t.
A simple formulation for the quality function H that satisfies Assumption 1 is the S-





The Main Result in the Monotone Environment
In order to set the stage for this result, consider an arbitrary x ∈ RN . For each s, we
associate to the component xi the value of t ∈ R such that the ith component of x∗(s, t) is
xi.
Definition 1 Let ti : R× R→ R be such that x∗i (s, ti(xi, s)) ≡ xi, for all i.
We now demonstrate the existence of a simple utility function which is uniquely maxi-
mized at the optimal x.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, for all s, t the following utility function implements x∗(s, t)–












∗(s, ti(z, s)), σ)g(σ|s, ti(z, s))dσdz.10
Proof. See Appendix.
10The lower limit in the outer integral is taken to be 0 to ensure convergence.
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This is the simplest utility function that delivers x∗(s, t), in that the adjustment term
α(x, s) is deterministic (independent of σ), additively separable from y, and additively sep-
arable across the components of x. Note also that such an adjustment term must depend on
both x and s and thus cannot be further simplified.
Proof in One Dimension
When x is one-dimensional, so N = 1, the individual’s first-order condition becomes∫
ϕx(x, σ)g(σ|s, t)dσ −
∫
ϕx(x
∗(s, t(x, s)), σ)g(σ|s, t(x, s))dσ = 0.
Since t(x, s) is the value of t that induces x as the solution to the constrained optimum,
it follows that x∗(s, t(x, s)) = x. Hence if x = x∗(s, t) then t(x, s) = t and this first-order
condition is satisfied. Further, if x < x∗(s, t), then t(x, s) < t. Since g(σ|s, t) is increasing in
t in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, it follows that
∫
ϕx(x, σ)g(σ|s, t(x, s))dσ >∫
ϕx(x, σ)g(σ|s, t)dσ, so that marginal expected utility of x is positive. Similarly, if x >
x∗(s, t), then marginal expected utility is negative. Hence x = x∗(s, t) is the global maximizer
of expected utility.
Sketch of Proof in Two Dimensions
The case in which x is two-dimensional serves to demonstrate the intuitive idea of the
general proof, although the general case is more complex technically. With N = 2, the
first-order conditions for maximizing expected utility are∫
ϕxi(x, σ)g(σ|s, t)dσ =
∫
ϕxi(x
∗(s, ti(xi, s)), σ)g(σ|s, ti(xi, s))dσ for i = 1, 2.
As required, these first-order conditions are satisfied by x = x∗(s, t) since this implies
ti(xi, s) = t, for i = 1, 2.
Moreover, x = x∗(s, t) is the unique global maximum. To see why, consider any x 6=
x∗(s, t). Figure 1 describes the directions in which expected utility unambiguously increases.
These directions can be established by signing the corresponding derivatives. These di-
rections lie in the NE quadrant and the SW quadrant relative to x∗(s, t). There are two
representative cases to consider. Case i) x ≥ x∗(s, t). In this case, Figure 2 sketches how
it is possible to move from a given such xA to x∗(s, t) in a fashion that increases expected

















Figure 2: Global optimality of x∗(s, t)
15
curve (step 1). Then move along this curve x∗(s, ·) to x∗(s, t) (step 2). (The case in the SW
quadrant where x ≤ x∗(s, t) is analogous.) Case ii) x1 ≥ x∗1(s, t) and x2 < x∗2(s, t). Refer
again to Figure 2. Consider a path from a given such xB to x∗(s, t) that first increases xB2




1(s, t), as in step 4. Step 4 is a limiting
case from Figure 1 where expected utility must increase, but step 3 is apparently ambigu-
ous. Consider, however, step 3’, where xB2 increases to x
∗
2(s, t), while holding x1 = x
∗
1(s, t).
Expected utility must increase in step 3’since it is again a limiting case from Figure 1. The
assumption that ϕx1x2(x, σ) ≥ 0 implies that expected utility must increase by at least as
much in step 3 as it does in step 3’, so it must increase in the two-step process– first step 3
and then step 4. The case in which x lies in the NW quadrant is analogous, so the sketch of
the proof is complete.
Observations
Note that this particular decomposition of utility generates a particular trade-offbetween
y and x, so the individual would sacrifice expected offspring for, say, more food. Furthermore,
this decomposition into y and x is unique, within the additively separable class in which
utility cannot depend directly on σ, even though y is itself a function of x as y = ϕ(x, σ).11
We illustrate the derivation of the adjustment term using Examples 1 and 2:
Example 1 (revisited) Consider now a situation in which the individual’s beliefs, as given
by the pdf g (σ|s, t) , strictly first order stochastically dominate the true distribution,
as given by the pdf f (σ|s, t) . It follows that the adjustment term in this case satisfies
αx(x, s) = C
′(x)− Eg (σ|s, t(x, s)) < C ′(x)− Ef (σ|s, t(x, s)) = 0,
since x = x∗(s, t(x, s)). That is, the adjustment term acts unambiguously to discourage
effort x. Such a situation might arise after illness, when the immune system is depleted,
but the individual is not fully cognizant of that fact. In this case, the value of s signals
sickness rather than good health. (As health and sickness are recurrent events, utility
11A measure of the contribution of Nature to the Individual’s decision is(∫
ϕxi(x
∗(s, t), σ)g(σ|s, t)dσ
)2
.
This measure is expressed purely in terms of the fitness function and so is independent of the utility
representation. It is a measure of how much the optimal choice of x∗(s, t) involves “adjusting”the Individual’s
preferences away from expected fitness, generating then derivatives of expected offspring that differ from zero.
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has been appropriately shaped for either contingency.) It is optimal for there to be less
effort in this circumstance, but the individual must be induced to withdraw effort by
a term in utility. Indeed, it is believed that, after illness, cytokines are released that
inhibit effort, with the individual exhibiting “anhedonia.”Evidence for the inhibitory
role of cytokines comes from experiments that involve injecting cytokines into healthy
rats, which make rats expend less effort for a given reward (see Trivers, 2011). More
generally, it may that the individual perceives a cost of effort that varies with the
task, even though the actual fitness cost of effort is invariant, as may be the case when
comparing walking on a familiar path with walking on a path while visiting a new city.
Example 2 (revisited) It is plausible here that the individual underestimates the impor-
tance of quality relative to the importance of quantity. This is because the quantity of
offspring is more directly and immediately observable than is their quality, which only
shows up as the quantity of distant descendants. Suppose specifically that the individ-
ual’s beliefs are distorted, with the distribution given by g (σ|s, t) being strictly first
order stochastically dominated by the true distribution, given by f (σ|s, t) . Further,
the impact of these distorted beliefs is that the individual underestimates the expected
marginal effect of the time investment x on average quality, h, so that
αx(x, s) = −
∫
hx (x, σ) g (σ|s, t(x, s)) dσ > −
∫
hx (x, σ) f (σ|s, t(x, s)) dσ = 0,
since x = x∗(s, t(x, s)).12 Now the adjustment term acts to unambiguously encourage
the action x, thereby discouraging quant ity n and encouraging quality H. We
return to this example in the next section, using it to illuminate how the persistence
of the adjustment term in the modern environment helps explain the demographic
transition.
4 Decisions in the Modern Environment
There are vast differences between the ancestral environment in which our basic preferences
evolved and the present environment. A central, though informal, claim in the literature on
evolutionary psychology is that such differences have led to “misalignments”in our prefer-
ences in the sense that we frequently make fitness-reducing choices. Notably, the preference
12Assumption 1 implies that hxx(x, σ) < 0, hσ(x, σ) > 0 and hxσ(x, σ) > 0. We also assume Hx(x, σ) > 0.
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misalignments studied thus far belong to a single category: those originating in technological
advances that have increased both the general availability of resources and our control over
reproduction. Common examples cited in the literature include the tendency of modern
humans to consume excessive amounts of sugar and fat and their tendency to use contra-
ceptives. In terms of our model, such misalignments would readily arise upon altering the
individual’s fitness function while holding his beliefs and utility function constant.
In this section, we investigate a different (and, to our knowledge, novel) category of
preference misalignments: those originating from our improved understanding, relative to our
hunter-gather ancestors, of the link between actions and fitness. In our model, as we illustrate
below, such misalignments arise when changing the individual’s beliefs while holding her
fitness and utility functions constant. Such misalignments generate a set of testable, revealed
preference predictions of the model.
For concreteness, we consider the problem of a perfectly-knowledgeable individual who
understands that the state σ is distributed according to f, not g, and is nevertheless endowed
with an “ancestral” utility function.13 In this exercise, to isolate the impact of improved
beliefs, we assume that the fitness function ϕ is the same for the ancestral and modern
environments.
Specifically, consider a monotone environment with N = 1. Moreover, suppose the indi-
vidual is endowed with the utility function in Theorem 1:
U(x, y, s) = y + α(x, s),




ϕx(z, σ)g(σ|s, t(z, s))dσdz. Define xM(s, t) as the solution to the
problem of maximizing expected utility Ef (U(x, y, s)), which uses modern beliefs.
Lemma 2 Impose Assumptions 1 and 2. Fix s and suppose the distribution given by the pdf
f(σ | s, t) is FOSD over that given by g(σ | s, t) (resp. g(σ | s, t) is FOSD over f(σ | s, t))
for all t. Then, assuming that xM(s, t) is finite, xM(s, t) > x∗(s, t) (resp. xM(s, t) < x∗(s, t))
for all t.
Proof. Recall that ∫
ϕx(x
∗(s, t), σ)f(σ|s, t)dσ = 0 for all s, t.
13More generally, analogous but reduced effects would arise if beliefs g moved in the direction of f in some
suitable sense.
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Further, for this one dimensional case, since f(σ | s, t) dominates g(σ | s, t),
αx(x, s) = −
∫
ϕx (x, σ) g (σ|s, t(x, s)) dσ > −
∫
ϕx (x, σ) f (σ|s, t(x, s)) dσ = 0, for all x, s.
Hence the first derivative of modern expected utility becomes:∫
ϕx(x, σ)f(σ | s, t)dσ + α′(x, s) > 0, for all x ≤ x∗(s, t).
It follows, as long as a finite solution exists, that xM(s, t) > x∗(s, t).14 The proof if g(σ | s, t)
dominates f(σ | s, t) is analogous.
This lemma indicates that when the individual’s ancestors underestimated (overesti-
mated) the marginal fitness value of a given action, this individual will select, once perfectly
informed, an excessively large (small) action relative to its fitness-maximizing level.
Application to the Demographic Transition
The defining features of the demographic transition, as experienced in Europe in the
nineteeth century, are usually taken to be–
• There is first a fall in the mortality rate, often partly due to simple and cheap, but
effective, measures to improve public health and medicine. This fall induces a growth
spurt in the population.
• The fertility rate eventually falls, reestablishing a rough balance between the birth and
death rates.
Additional salient features include:
• Income rises on average during the transition.
• Migration from the country to the city takes place, with a shift away from agriculture
and into manufacturing.
• The educational system expands.
14If a finite solution is not assumed to exist, it may be that
∫
ϕx(x, σ)dF (σ | s, t) +αx(x, s) > 0, for all x.
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The basic puzzle that then arises is: Why did fertility fall sharply following a sharp fall
in mortality? That is, given that incomes rose, why would individuals not use the extra
resources to produce more offspring?15
We show that Example 2 contributes to an explanation of this puzzle–
Example 2 (revisited once more) We illustrate the results by means of an application
of the model of the quantity and quality of offspring to the demographic transition.
Utility including the adjustment term is now
U(x, y, s) = y + α(x, s)
where




hx (z, σ) g (σ|s, t(z, s)) dzdσ.
If the individual has correct beliefs in the modern environment, it follows that
Ef (Ux(x, h(x, σ), s) =
∫
hx(x, σ)f (σ|s, t) dσ + αx(x, s).
In order to derive the distortion that arises, consider any x that is no greater than the
evolutionarily optimal choice, so that x ≤ x∗(s, t). Then, since
∫
hx(x, σ)f (σ|s, t) dσ ≥
0, it follows that Ef (Ux(x, h(x, σ), s) + αx(x, s) > 0, for such x ≤ x∗(s, t). Hence
the individual is induced to increase her investment in the quality of offspring beyond
the point of evolutionary optimality, correspondingly lowering the quantity of offspring.
Thus a shift towards greater appreciation of the merits of the quality of offspring might
lead to an overemphasis on quality, at the expense of quantity. Such an effect could then
help explain a basic puzzle of the demographic transition. That is, if a concomitant of
the transition were greater scientific awareness in general and greater awareness of the
consequences of quality in particular, this would lead to an overemphasis on quality,
since preferences were already shaped to encourage quality.
This result is reminiscent of the central finding in the multitasking agency literature
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). In both cases the agent’s incentive to perform well along
one dimension (quantity, here) has the tendency to crowd out her effort along another di-
mension (quality, here). In the multitasking literature this result emerges from effort along
15A compendious detailed reference is Chesnais (1992).
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one dimension being relatively easier to assess by the principal. In contrast, in the present
setting it arises from the agent’s misinformation about the relative value of effort along
each dimension. Another difference vis a vis the multitasking literature is that effort is
fully contractable here, and thus the first best is attainable by means of a suitable utility
adjustment.
We return to the demographic transition at the end of the next section, in which we
discuss how imitation might be similarly exaggerated in modern circumstances. In the final
section, we return to the demographic transition for the last time, with an integrated model
that incorporates imitation that has similarly recently been exaggerated.
5 Imitation, Prepared Learning and the Demographic
Transition
In the present section, we show how a relative consumption effect can be generated by the
current framework. We achieve this by means of an model that is extended to allow an infinite
sequence of individuals, each of whom observes the choice of a predecessor, and to allow the
state to evolve. We also make simplifying assumptions– that fitness is quadratic and that the
signals are normally distributed.16 This approach sheds light on an interesting psychological
phenomenon– that of “prepared learning”. In addition, this approach provides a foundation
for the model of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) of the demographic transition.
The distortion created by the inaccuracy of individual beliefs is subtle– it arises from
the individual’s misperception of the informativeness of the transient signal relative to that
of the action of the predecessor. Once utility evolved to make a suitable correction for
these inaccurate beliefs, it would induce overshooting in a modern environment. That is,
individuals might well now imitate too much, to the detriment of evolutionary success.
The key antecedent in this context is Samuelson (2004). The conceptual outline of
Samuelson’s model is similar– he also supposes that the observable but inherently irrelevant
consumption of others conveys information about an unobservable but relevant state. Given
the agent’s defective statistical assessment of the available signals, it is optimal for evolution
to warp the agent’s utility function by including relative consumption. The novelty of our
approach is in providing a biological basis for utility functions in general. Moreover, as
evolutionary explanations for a concern with relative consumption, our models differ in their
16Simple versions of Examples 1 and 2 also entail quadratic fitness and normal signals.
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details, and, more importantly, we provide new applications to prepared learning and to the
demographic transition.
In order to set the stage and to define a suitable notion of “peer effect”, consider two
individuals who choose sequentially, with individual 1 choosing in the light of her transient
signal, t1, and individual 2 choosing in the light of his transient signal, t2 and individual
1’s choice, x1. (We will shortly generalize this model to consider an infinite sequence of
individuals.) For simplicity, we omit the recurrent signal, s. In the end, the choice of a
previous individual will play a role similar to that once played by s. The transient signals
are independent, so observing x1 is useful to individual 2. Given the appropriate utility
function, individual 1 effectively maximizes
∫
ϕ(x1, σ)f(σ|t1)dσ by choosing x∗1(t1). Given




> 0, so individual 2 can infer t1 from any
possible observed value of x1. We can then formulate individual 2’s beliefs and choices in
terms of x1.
Consider now individual 2’s ideal choice, x∗2(x1, t2), given x1, and t2. This is the choice
that maximizes
∫
ϕ(x2, σ)f̂(σ|x1, t2)dσ. In this expression, f̂ represents the true pdf for σ
conditional on x1 and t2. Assume that increases in either of x1 or t2 increase the distribution
for σ in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. The problem facing individual 2
remains analogous to that described in detail in Section 4, with x1 playing the role that was
played by s and t2 playing the role of t.
Applying Theorem 1 in this context, it follows that there exists a utility function whose
expectation under individual 2’s beliefs, given by the pdf g(σ|x1, t2), is uniquely maximized
by x∗2(x1, t2) of the form
U2(x2, y2, x1) = y2 + β(x2, x1).
The following captures a “conformity”or “anticonformity”effect–
Definition 2 Define the (marginal) peer effect as ∂
2β(x2,x1)
∂x2∂x1
. If this peer effect is positive–
∂2β(x2,x1)
∂x2∂x1
> 0, an increase in the action taken by individual 1 increases the marginal utility of
the action taken by individual 2, thus spurring an increase in x1, and there is a conformity
effect. If this peer effect is negative– ∂
2β(x2,x1)
∂x2∂x1
< 0, there is an anticonformity effect .
Extension to Many Individuals
With just two individuals, there must be an asymmetry– one player sees what the other
chooses, but there is no-one for that individual to observe. We turn now an infinite sequence
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of individuals, where all of these, except the first, will be in a position to observe a choice
made by a predecessor. This example is also richer in that it allows the state to evolve
as a random walk. If there were a fixed state and each individual drew an independent
signal concerning this, the uncertainty concerning the state would disappear in the limit,
conditional on all the signals. The introduction of a state that evolves as a random walk
is also inherently plausible and hence of independent interest. It captures in a stylized
fashion how the climate, for example, might evolve over time and therefore lead to a need
to continuously update choices.
Suppose individuals n = 1, 2, ... choose in sequence. The state, σn, affecting individual n,
is a random walk given by σn+1 = σn + εσn+1 where εσn+1 ∼ N(0, v), for v > 0 and n ≥ 1. At
n = 1, suppose σ1 = εσ1 . (How the process is initialized is not important in the long run.)
Each individual n gets a transient signal tn = σn + εtn , where εtn ∼ N(0, u), and, if n > 1,
also sees the predecessor’s choice xn−1. The random variables εσn and εtn are independent
of each other and over all n. Fitness for each individual n is given by −(σn − xn)2.
Suppose xn is the optimal choice for individual n > 1 given xn−1 and tn. (We write xn
instead of x∗n for simplicity. The xn will be characterized below. For n = 1, x1 is optimal
given t1 alone.) Let εxn = xn − σn and let wn = E(σn − xn)2 = E(εxn)2, for all n. These
denote the error made by individual made by n and its variance, respectively. We can derive
a difference equation for the wn, given by a function ρ, and establish the properties of ρ, as
follows:
Lemma 3 In the peer imitation model, wn+1 =
u(v+wn)
u+v+wn
≡ ρ(wn), for all n. This difference
equation has a unique fixed point w∗ ∈ (0, u) such that w∗ = ρ(w∗). Further, the difference
equation is stable, with w1 = u and wn ↓ w∗, as n→∞.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider now the steady state of the above process, which is characterized as follows,
dropping the asterisk from w∗ for simplicity,
xn+1 = ktn+1 + (1− k)xn, where k =
v + w
u+ v + w
.




























Consider some relevant results from the psychology literature on prepared learning. Mon-
keys exhibit neither an inborn fear of snakes nor one of flowers. However, they readily learn
to be afraid of snakes if they observe another monkey acting fearfully in the presence of a
snake. It is much more diffi cult to teach them similarly to be afraid of flowers (Cook and
Mineka, 1989, for example).
The model sheds light on these phenomena. Suppose that v, the noisiness of the random
walk describing the state, decreases (or that u, the noisiness of the transient signal, increases).
Since ∂k
∂v
> 0 (and ∂k
∂u
< 0) it follows that the weight 1− k put on the previous individual’s
choice increases. That is, individual n + 1 is more responsive to individual n’s choice. It
seems plausible that the evolutionary consequences of snakes have been subject to less drift
over time (or that the evolutionary consequences of snakes are less precisely reflected in the
transient signal). This is consistent with the observation that individuals aremore influenced
by peer choices concerning snakes than they are by those concerning flowers.
Evolved Utility
The above analysis concerns only what is evolutionarily best and has, so far, abstracted
from the beliefs of the individual. Such evolutionarily optimal behavior might be orches-
trated despite inaccurate beliefs by means of a suitable utility function. Suppose that the
individual’s beliefs are given by a pdf g as follows. The individual believes that tn = σn+ε′tn
where ε′tn ∼ N(0, u′) and believes that xn = σn+1+ δn where δn ∼ N(0, z′). (In contrast, the
true steady state distributions are tn = σn+εtn with εtn ∼ N(0, u) and xn = σn+1+εxn−εσn+1
so that εxn − εσn+1 ∼ N(0, z), where z = v + w.) Evolved utility, including the adjustment
term, is then
U(xn, yn, xn−1) = yn + β(xn, xn−1) = −(xn − σn)2 −
k′ − k
k






= 0 at xn = ktn + (1 − k)xn−1 as is evolutionarily optimal.18 Thus,
because each individual does not see the appropriate relevance of xn−1 as a signal of the
and ∂w∂v =
u−w





(u+v+w)2 < 0 and
∂k
∂v > 0, since
uv
v+2w − (v + w) < 0
follows from w = u(v+w)u+v+w .
18That is, ∂EgU(xn,yn,xn−1)∂xn = −2(xn−k
′tn−(1−k′)xn−1)−2k
′−k
k (xn−xn−1) = 0 at xn = ktn+(1−k)xn−1.
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state, they are programmed to treat xn−1 as an argument of utility. If k′ > k, it follows that
∂2β(xn,xn−1)
∂xn∂xn−1
> 0 so there is then a conformity effect. If k′ > k, there is an anticonformity
effect.
Excessive Mimicry
What would happen if the individual became fully aware of the relevance of both signals?
Suppose, that is, that the beliefs g are replaced by the true distribution f , while the utility
function remains the same. The existence of the term β(xn, xn−1) in utility now leads to a









It follows that i) If k′ > k, a fully informed individual would put too much weight on the
actions of another. ii) If k = k′, then there is no distortion. iii) If k′ < k, then a fully
informed individual puts too little weight on the actions of another.20
If it is accepted as a stylized fact that modern individuals have an intrinsic tendency to
conform, the relevant case is i). Modern individuals would then weight the actions of others
too highly, relative to what would be evolutionarily optimal.
This suboptimality can be captured more precisely as follows. We have xn+1 = k̂tn+1 +
(1 − k̂)xn, for k̂ = k
2
k′ , implying that xn+1 = σn+1 + k̂εtn+1 + (1 − k̂)(ε̂xn − εσn+1), where
ε̂xn = xn − σn is the random error associated with k̂. Let E (ε̂xn)
2 = ŵ be the associated
steady state error variance. If w∗ is the optimal (minimal) variance, then w∗ < ŵ.21 (Indeed,
any procedure that combines the two signals tn+1 and xn in a different linear way than
does the optimal procedure generates strictly lower fitness.) Furthermore, the distortion for
19This follows since, for this value of xn,
∂EfU(xn, yn, xn−1)
∂xn





(xn − xn−1) = 0.
20If k′ ∈ [k2, k), then 0 ≤ 1− k2k′ < 1− k, and a fully informed individual puts a weight that is too small,
but still non-negative, on the actions of the predecessor. If k′ < k2 then 0 > 1− k2k′ so the individual places
a negative weight on the action of the predecessor.
21To prove this, note first that ŵ = k̂2u+(1− k̂)2(v+ ŵ). Define ∆(w) = w− k̂2u+(1− k̂)2(v+w), so that
∆(ŵ) = 0, and ∆′(w) = 1− (1− k̂)2 > 0. It is easily shown that k2u+ (1−k)2(v+w) is minimized by choice
of k = v+wu+v+w . It follows then that ∆(w
∗) = w∗− k̂2u+ (1− k̂)2(v+w∗) < w∗− k2u+ (1− k)2(v+w∗) = 0,
so w∗ < ŵ, as claimed.
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modern choices induced in this way can be relatively arbitrarily large.22
5.1 The Demographic Transition
We now apply the imitation model of the current section to add an important component to
our treatment of the demographic transition. The imitation model already supports the ap-
proach of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981). They assume that individuals have an intrinsic
interest in mimicking the fertility decisions of others and that the cultural transmission of
reduced fertility might outweigh natural selection in favor of maintaining high fertility. Our
imitation model illustrates how such an interest in mimicry might have evolved. It then
shows how a plausible shift in circumstances (better informed individuals) will indeed lead
to mimicry being excessive relative to the evolutionary optimum.
We now blend our imitation model with Example 2. For this purpose, we assume that
the choice, x, in the imitation model represents the time investment in the quality of each
offspring. We also assume that fitness is quadratic. Note that assuming that ϕ(x, σ) = −(σ−
x)2 is operationally equivalent to assuming it is of the form ϕ(x, σ) = h(x, σ) = σx − Ax2,
as in the simple case of Example 2.23 In the imitation model, there are two signals available
to the individual– the contemporaneous transient signal and the action of the predecessor.
Suppose now that each individual has beliefs that are erroneous not merely because she
misestimates the relative precision of the two signals, but because she underestimates the
mean of the state given either signal, as in Example 2 (“ revisited once more”). That is, the
individual’s beliefs, g, are now given as:
tn = σn + c+ ε
′
tn , where ε
′
tn ∼ N(0, u
′) and xn = σn+1 + d+ δn where δn ∼ N(0, z′).
All other elements of the imitation model remain as before. The relative precision of the
predecessor’s choice is underestimated, so that k′ = z
′
u′+z′ > k =
z
u+z
. To capture the under-
estimation of the state given the signals, we further assume that c, d > 0.
22To prove this, consider the limit as v → 0. From w = u(v+w)u+v+w and k =
v+w
u+v+w , it follows that both w → 0
and k → 0. If k′ > 0 is fixed, then k̂ = k2k′ → 0 as well. From ŵ = k̂




(2−k̂)k̂ . Using w =
u(v+w)




+ k, so that vk2 → u as v → 0.
Hence ŵ → uk′2 > 0, but w
∗ → 0, as v → 0,as claimed.
23Indeed, −(σ − x)2 = −σ2 + 2xσ − x2 = 2(xσ − x22 )− σ
2. Although the term −σ2 varies with the pdf, it
has no effect on the optimal choice, x.
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In the ancient steady state, evolved utility of the form
U(xn, yn, xn−1) = yn+β(xn, xn−1) = −(xn−σn)2−
k′ − k
k
(xn−xn−1)2+2 (k′c+ (1− k′)d)xn
would have generated evolutionary optimality.24
Consider now the modern distorted choice that arises with this utility function, but with
the correct beliefs, f. From the first-order condition ∂EfU(xn,yn,xn−1)
∂xn








(k′c+ (1− k′)d) k
k′
.
We now derive the increased variance associated with this choice of xn. The effect of
underestimating of the mean of the state is to add a new term to this variance. Fomally, let
xn− σn = ε̂xn , in the steady state. Suppose E (xn − σn) = m̂ and E (xn − σn − m̂)
2 = ŵ. It
follows that m̂ = k
′c+(1−k′)d
k
and the equation that determines ŵ is ŵ = k̂2u+(1− k̂)2(v+ ŵ),
as above when c = d = 0.25 Finally, we have that E (xn − σn)2 = ŵ + (m̂)2, as claimed.
Combined Impact of Evolved Concerns for Imitation and for Offspring Quality
To summarize: Not only does the individual place too much weight on the choice of the
predecessor, but she also uniformly increases her own choice. The first effect causes the
variance of the choice to be too high, and so lowers fitness. The second effect independently
raises the mean of the choice and therefore also raises the variance and further lowers fitness.
The central mystery of the demographic transition concerns the fall in fertility that
occurred despite, or because of, a rise in income. This juxtaposition is puzzling even from an
economic point of view, but it can be resolved by supposing a suitably high level of concern
with the quality of offspring (see Becker and Lewis, 1973, for example). This juxtaposition
is still more challenging to explain as evolutionarily optimal.
24To see why, note that the first-order condition
∂EgU(xn, yn, xn−1)
∂xn
= −2(xn − k′tn − 2(1− k′)xn−1 − γ)−
k′ − k
k
(xn − xn−1) + 2(k′c+ (1− k′)d) = 0,
implies xn = ktn + (1− k)xn−1.
25These results follow from the steady state relationship








We finesse this challenge by arguing that our evolved utility functions might well have
led to evolutionary suboptimality in the circumstances of the transition. That is, a tendency
to imitate and a concern with quality were embedded in utility by misperceptions that were
plausibly once prevalent. If these misperceptions were reduced at the time of the transition,
the result would be overimitation combined with an exaggerated concern with quality, thus
at once buttressing the approach of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and that of Becker
and Lewis (1973).
6 Conclusions
Our motivating question was: Supposing, for the sake of argument, that we are intelligent
and rational, why is our evolved utility not simply offspring? We formulated a principal-
agent model in which both Nature and the individual observed two signals– one recurrent
and one transient– that bear on the fitness consequences of the agent’s choices. The agent,
however, has arbitrary beliefs about the implications of the signals. One abstract option
would be for Nature to explicitly and directly communicate her accurate beliefs to the agent,
who could then choose optimally by maximizing expected fitness in the light of these beliefs.
This option, however, is simply not a good description of humans, even though we are
presumably closer than any other species.
Alternatively, we consider the option that Nature shapes the utility function in the light
of the recurrent signal only. The individual then maximizes the expectation of this util-
ity conditional on her arbitrary beliefs. We show, remarkably, that this option could also
generate optimal choice in the context of the model. That this method seems to be one in
evidence, despite the existence of a theoretically more direct way of achieving the same end,
may then have been harmless phylogenetic happenstance.
We showed that utility is a “whispering within”urging individuals to take actions that
reflect the evolutionary wisdom of a multitude of ancestors, in addition to accounting for local
on-the-spot information. The loudness of the whisper, or the force of the push delivered by
Nature, ultimately derives from the extent to which the individual’s beliefs were erroneous.
In vastly changed modern conditions the mechanism would no longer be evolutionarily
optimal. Indeed, if the individual now has fully accurate beliefs, modern decisions will be
distorted in accordance with the loudness of the whisper. In these circumstances, once utility
has arguments other than offspring, it will generate systematically biased choices, providing
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empirical content for the current theory.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1.
The function x∗(s, t) is characterized by the first-order conditions∫
ϕxi(x


















The n × n matrix A is symmetric, negative definite, and has non-negative off-diagonal el-
ements. Hence −A is a Stieltjes matrix, which must have a symmetric and non-negative











≥ 0, for j = 1, ..., N. Further, since A−1 is non-singular, it cannot have
any row be entirely zero, and it must indeed be that
∂x∗j (s,t)
∂t




> 0, for j = 1, ..., N is analogous.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Select an arbitrary s. To simplify notation, we then drop the dependence of x∗(·) and α(·)
on s. Define, for all x and t,
V (x; t) = E [ϕ(x, σ) | t] + α(x),
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where the expectation is taken over σ using the pdf g.
We wish to show that V (x∗(t), t) > V (x, t) for all t and all x 6= x∗(t).
Remark 1 Properties of V (x; t). For all i and all t:
1. ∂
∂xi
V (xi, x−i; t) is weakly increasing in x−i for all xi.
2. ∂
∂xi
V (x; t) is strictly increasing in t for all x.
3. ∂
∂xi
V (x∗(t); t) = 0.
Proof. From the definitions of V (·) and α(·) we obtain
∂
∂xi
V (x; t) = E
[





∗(ti(xi)), σ) | ti(xi)
]
. (3)
For property 1, note that the first term on the R.H.S. of (3) is weakly increasing in x−i
(since, by assumption, ∂
2
∂xi∂xj
ϕ(x, σ) ≥ 0 for all x, σ and all i 6= j), and the second term is
independent of x−i.




ϕ(x, σ) > 0 for all x, σ and all i, and the pdf g is increasing in t in
first-order stochastic dominance), and the second term is independent of t.









∗(ti(xi)), σ) | ti(xi)
]
.
Now select an arbitrary t and an arbitrary x 6= x∗(t). Let τ i = ti(xi) for all i. Assume,
WLOG, that τ 1 ≤ τ 2 ≤ ... ≤ τN . Also, select two numbers τ 0 and τN+1 such that τ 0 ≤
min{τ 1, t} and τN+1 ≥ max{τN , t}.
Define
M+ = {i : xi ≥ x∗i (t)} ,
M− = {i : xi < x∗i (t)} .
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Note that
V (x ∨ x∗(t); t) =







V (x∗i≤n(τ), xi>n; t)dτ ,
and
V (x ∨ x∗(t); t) =







V (x∗i∈M−(t), xi∈Mn+ , x
∗
i≥n(τ); t)dτ ,
where Mn+ is defined as the set {i ∈M+ : i < n} .
It follows that















V (x∗i∈M−(t), xi∈Mn+ , x
∗
i≥n(τ); t)dτ .
We begin by showing that V (x∗(t); t) ≥ V (x; t), for which we proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We show that all terms in the first sum of (4) are nonnegative. Fix n ∈ M−.
For all τ ∈ (τn,min {τn+1, t}) (a possibly empty interval) we have
d
dτ




























x∗j(τ) > 0 for all j.)
The first weak inequality in (5) follows from property 1 of the remark: xi ≥ xi(min {τn+1, t})
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for all i > n implies
∂
∂xj
V (x∗i≤n(τ), xi>n; t) ≥
∂
∂xj
V (x∗i≤n(τ), xi>n(min {τn+1, t}); t) for all j ≤ n.




V (x∗i≤n(τ), xi>n(min {τn+1, t}); t) ≥
∂
∂xj
V (x∗i≤n(τ), xi>n(min {τn+1, t}); min {τn+1, t}) for all j ≤ n.
Finally, the strict inequality in (5) follows from combining all three properties of the
remark: τ < min {τn+1, t} implies x∗i (τ) < x∗i (min {τn+1, t}) for all i and therefore
∂
∂xj
V (x∗i≤n(τ), xi>n(min {τn+1, t}); min {τn+1, t}) ≥
∂
∂xj
V (x∗(τ); min {τn+1, t}) >
∂
∂xj
V (x∗(τ); τ) = 0 for all j ≤ n.
Step 2. We show that all terms in the second sum of (4) are nonpositive. Fix n ∈ M+.
Note that for all τ ∈ (max {τn−1, t} , τn) (a possibly empty interval) we have
d
dτ
V (x∗i∈M−(t), xi∈Mn+ , x
∗


































x∗i<n(max {τn−1, t}) implies
∂
∂xj





V (x∗i<n(max {τn−1, t}), x∗i≥n(τ); t) for all j ≥ n.




V (x∗i<n(max {τn−1, t}), x∗i≥n(τ); t) ≤
∂
∂xj
V (x∗i<n(max {τn−1, t}), x∗i≥n(τ); max {τn−1, t}) for all j ≥ n.
Finally, the strict inequality in (6) follows from combining all three properties of the
remark: τ > max {τn−1, t} implies x∗i (τ) > x∗i (max {τn−1, t}) for all i and therefore
∂
∂xj
V (x∗i<n(max {τn−1, t}), x∗i≥n(τ); max {τn−1, t}) ≤
∂
∂xj
V (x∗(τ); max {τn−1, t}) <
∂
∂xj
V (x∗(τ); τ) = 0 for all j ≥ n.
We now show that V (x∗(t); t) > V (x; t). Since x 6= x∗(t) there exists either an n ∈ M−
such that the interval (τn,min {τn+1, t}) is nonempty, or an n ∈ M+ such that the interval
(max {τn−1, t} , τn) is nonempty (or both). In the former case, it follows from step 1 above
that at least one of the integrals in the first sum of (4) is positive. In the latter case, it follows
from step 2 above that at least one of the integrals in the second sum of (4) is negative. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
As part of the inductive proof, we show that εxn is independent of εσm and εtm for m =
n+1, n+2, .., and for n = 1, 2, .... At t = 1, it follows that σ1 = t1−εt1 so it follows that the
optimal x1 = t1. (Whenever fitness is quadratic, the evolutionarily optimal choice of x is the
mean of the distribution of σ.) Furthermore, it follows that w1 ≡ E(σ1−x1)2 = E(εt1 )
2 = u,
where x1 − σ1 is independent of εσn and εtn for n = 2, ... . As the induction hypothesis,
suppose the result holds for n so that, in particular, εxn is independent of εσm and εtm for
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m = n + 1, n + 2, ... It follows that the posterior distribution of σn+1 given xn and tn+1 is
normal with mean given by
kntn+1 + (1− kn)xn where kn =
v + wn
u+ v + wn
= k(u, v, wn),
and variance given by
wn+1 = k
2
nu+ (1− kn)2(v + wn) =
u(v + wn)
u+ v + wn
= ρ(wn),
say. The optimal choice of xn+1 is then xn+1 = kntn+1 + (1 − kn)xn conditional on tn+1
and xn, given the quadratic fitness function.26 Now, completing part of the proof, we have
εxn+1 = xn+1 − σn+1 is independent of εσm and εtm for m = n+ 2, ... .
Then ρ′(wn) = (1− kn)2 ∈ (0, 1). Also ρ(0) = uvu+v > 0 and ρ(u) =
(u+v)u
2u+v
< u. It follows
that the difference equation wn+1 = ρ(wn) generates monotonic convergence wn ↓ w∗, as
n→∞ from w1 = u to the unique w∗ ∈ (0, u) such that w∗ = ρ(w∗).
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